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1. Introduction 
A conventional wisdom of the decentralization theory and experience of foreign developing 
countries underline the potential positive impact of fiscal decentralization on the countries’ welfare and 
growth. Decentralization of regional and municipal finances supposedly helps to transform a highly 
centralized and interventionist government into the one encouraging decentralized economic activities and 
such institutions as democracy, rule of law and separation of the powers. 
Mainstream of economic research was focused on the decentralization of subnational units within a 
federal country and involved thus cross-country comparisons. Decentralization at the lower level within the 
subjects of federation was less studied mainly because of the lack of lower level data. However, this kind of 
comparison is also important since it gives an idea of the decentralization impact at the micro-level and could 
yield more reliable empirical analysis because of no need to control for differences on the country level.  
Although the average degree of decentralization within Russian regions was steadily growing 
(Freinkman and Yossifov, 1998 and table 7), Russia was still left behind other post-socialist countries. The 
majority of papers highlights a bunch of impediments, which lead to the poor performance of the 
decentralized regions in Russia. Among the other disorders, the country was demonstrating the evident 
regional inequality and differences in living conditions in large cities and rural rayons. It is clear that 
inequality can be attributed to the climate differences and also to the differences in tax bases of 
municipalities. However, a number of economists (Musgrave, 1959 and Oates, 1972) predicted that 
inequality could arise as a result of fiscal decentralization process. In many respects decentralization also 
means less of redistribution within a region, which in turn could lead to an increasing inequality.  
     We suggest that because of the lower starting capital conditions, underdeveloped investment 
infrastructure and difficult access to the capital market, in Russia fiscal decentralization could be fostering 
even greater municipal inequality than it could be expected. The problem here is that although fiscal 
decentralization gives to municipalities better access to local information and incentives for better 
management of municipal enterprises, low capital and inability to borrow money at the capital market can 
lead to the opposite effect when the restrictions on public funds mobility are imposed. The effect could be 
especially strong in the poor municipalities. This means that in the environment when capital markets are 
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imperfect fiscal centralization might compensate the low capital mobility by an increased mobility of public 
funds in the region. 
Economic literature emphasises that there is a link between the level of inequality and growth rates. 
The sign of the correlation between growth rates and inequality has been the subject of considerable debate 
in resent years. We suggest, that in Russia inequality among municipalities may negatively influence 
aggregate regional growth and may also negatively influence growth rates of the poorer municipalities. 
       Thus, the aim of the research is  
- to find out how fiscal decentralization within a region affects municipal inequality and whether it is 
forcing poor municipalities to become even poorer  (relative to the more wealthy ones);  
- to understand whether the negative effect of the poorest municipalities performance on the regional 
growth rates can possibly dominate the positive effect of wealthy ones, that is, whether increasing 
inequality negatively effects regional growth rates 
 
2. Literature review 
A conventional wisdom of the decentralization theory and the experience of foreign developing 
countries underline the potential positive impact of fiscal decentralization on growth and country’s welfare. I 
divide all the literature on fiscal decentralization into the two broad groups - theoretical and empirical.  
The first strand of the theoretical literature emphasizes a sort of traditional view indicating the allocative 
benefits of fiscal decentralization. Here we can include papers by Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), Hayek 
(1945) and Tiebout (1956). 
Among the potential benefits of delegating power to the lower levels of government economists 
usually list better access to local information, which allows them to provide public goods more efficiently 
(Hayek, 1945). In his famous paper Tiebout (1956) also showed that decentralization encouraging 
interregional competition through the “voting-by-feet” mechanism positively influences the level of the 
public goods provision. Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) in turn focus on the efficiency improving tax 
assignment to the different levels of government. 
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However, the paper by Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) emphasizes also inequality and fiscal 
instability among the possible shortcomings of decentralization, which could appear because of different tax 
capacities and the climate peculiarities of the region. 
The second strand of the theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization focuses mainly on the 
central - local fiscal relationships. This kind of literature could also be divided into the two main parts. The 
first one deals with the soft budget constraints hypothesis and focuses mainly on the effects of soft budget 
constraints on the enterprise behaviour (on the micro level). For example, Quin and Roland (1997) linked 
together the concepts of decentralization and  “soft budget constraint”. Soft budget constraints were the main 
feature of the Soviet economies since Federal government bailed out regional governments in case they 
cannot meet the expenditures target (allocating transfers, setting different tax agreements). Qian and Roland 
showed that monetary centralization, together with fiscal decentralization, induces a conflict of interests and 
thus may harden budget constraints and reduce inflation. They also found that fiscal competition among local 
governments under factor mobility increases the opportunity cost of bailout and serves as a commitment 
device (“the competition effect”). Moreover, they found that fiscal decentralization induces over-investment 
and under-provision of public goods.  
All the above papers point out at the positive effects of the budget constraints hardening. In contrast, 
Che (1999) showed that by securing a stable macro environment through the use of soft budget constraints, 
centralized financing enhances rather than compromises firms’ incentives as compared to decentralized 
financing. She also suggested that the dual track system have simultaneously advantages of both centralized 
and decentralized financing and can further enhance firms’ incentives as compared to centralized financing. 
Brandt and Zhu (1997) claim that financial decentralization should not by itself be seen as a panacea for 
dealing with the state sector. Decentralization well ahead of the pace of restructuring will only intensify 
inflationary pressure, and thus run the risk of macro-instability. 
The second strand of literature focuses mainly on the government policies. This kind of papers claim 
that the central government policy is also very important while determining the influence of fiscal 
decentralization on the countries’ welfare and growth. Here we can include papers by Keen (1997), 
Berkowitz and Li (1997), Treisman (1999) and  Knight and Li (1999), Jin, Qian, Weingast (1999). Keen 
(1997) suggests one of the explanations of Russia’s poor performance and its falling far behind other 
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developing countries. Keen (1997) shows that overlapping tax bases could lead to vertical tax externalities 
between levels of government with responses to the tax policies of one level of government affecting the tax 
base of the other. Berkowitz and Li (2000) argue that one reason for the difference between Russia and 
China in their performance is that Chinese local governments enjoy more sharply defined rights of taxation 
than their counterparts in Russia. They suggest that decentralization in Russia has lead to the “tragedy of the 
commons” in which many local governments became part of a predatory tax system. Differences in 
subnational governments’ rights of taxation provide an explanation for the success of the regions, which are 
on the “single-channel” tax system in attracting investment capital. Treisman (1999) found that regions in 
Russia compete not only in public goods provision but also in providing different levels of protection from 
the federal tax agencies to multiregional firms or “oligarchs” which is supplied in exchange to the tax 
payments to the regional budgets or to bribes or other unofficial payments. This type of competition is 
favourable to large multiregional enterprises having offices in several regions and getting use of the higher 
mobility of their tax bases. Treisman showed that such problems as growing inequality, arrears to the federal 
budget and flourishing of unofficial economy could be the possible consequences of such a type of 
competition which is in turn the consequence of inefficiently high tax burden falling on the enterprises.  
Empirical literature on fiscal decentralization could also be divided into the two main parts, that is, 
cross-country and within country comparisons. Among the papers focusing mainly on the cross-country 
comparisons we can list the papers by Huther and Shah (1998) and Treisman (1999). Papers by Freinkman 
and Yossifov (1998), Zhuravskaya (1999) and Jin, Qian, Weingast (1999) deal, in contrast, with within-
country comparisons. Freinkman and Yossifov (1998) found that the role of the local governments 
substantially increased since 1992 and municipalities were demonstrating gradually increasing share of their 
own municipal expenditures in the total regional expenditures. Regions were at the same time demonstrating 
more and more increased share of their own expenditures in the total amount of expenditures. However, 
there was very high variation of this coefficient across the whole country. Freinkman and Yossifov found 
that fiscal decentralization is positively related to the share of education spending to the regional education 
spending, real industrial growth and purchasing power of population. They suggest that regions with more 
decentralized finances tend to have lower economic decline.  
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However, despite the increasing level of decentralization Russia is still left behind such former 
socialist countries as Poland, Chech Republic and China. There were several papers which made attempts to 
explain why this was the case.  
  One of them was the theory of “market preserving federalism”. The theory of “market preserving 
federalism” implies that not any form of decentralization will lead to the efficient federation structure. 
“Market preserving federalism” suggests that lower governments assume primarily responsibility over the 
economic matters within their jurisdictions, local governments are closely linked to the revenues they 
generated, goods and factors become mobile across localities and local governments engage in inter-regional 
competition. This is the kind of fiscal federalism established in China and supposed to be one of the reasons 
encouraging a rapid growth in China.  In particular, applying the theory to Russia Zhuravskaya (1999) found 
that in spite of the process of decentralization in Russia Russian municipalities have never been independent 
of the regions they belong. Increase in the own revenues of the municipality is accompanied by decrease in 
“shared” revenues (share of VAT retained of the size of federal or regional transfers). Predatory behaviour of 
the regions depriving municipalities of the right to mange their own revenues prevent the private business 
formation and lead to the underprovision of public goods. Another empirical paper developing the concept of 
fiscal incentives and market preserving federalism is the paper by Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999). The paper 
implies that fiscal decentralization alone is not enough to explain the growth of the non-state sector, marginal 
fiscal incentives also has significant explanatory power  
 
3. Fiscal Decentralization  
What do we understand by “fiscal decentralization”? Decentralization is not easily defined. It takes 
many forms and has several dimensions. Under the concept of  “fiscal decentralization” we understand the 
assignment of fiscal responsibilities to the lower levels of government, that is, the degree of regional (local) 
autonomy and the authority of local governments to to decide upon its own expenditures and its ability to 
generate local revenues. Many empirical studies emphasize that there is a strong link between the degree of 
fiscal decentralization and federal countries’ economic development. In order to make some predictions on 
the part of Russia we tried to analyze the consequences of fiscal decentralization at the regional-local level 
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since the possibility of regional authorities to build their own fiscal relationships with local governments 
gives us enough variation to test our hypotheses empirically.   
For the estimation of the degree of fiscal decentralization of Russian regions we use measures 
adopted in the most resent literature on fiscal decentralization (Bahl and Linn, 1992, Freinkman and 
Yossifov, 1997, Bird and Vaillancourt, 1997, Zhang and Zou, 1998), which describe different dimentions of 
the fiscal decentralization process. The most frequently used measures are 1) the share of local government 
expenditures in the total consolidated regional budgetary expenditures which is supposedly reflects the share 
of public spending for which local governments are responsible; 2) the share of local government revenues in 
the total consolidated regional budgetary revenues which are collected from the local tax base (the measure 
reflects the ability of local governments to raise taxes from the local tax base); 3) the share of regional 
transfers in the total local revenues which reflects the degree of dependence of local governments on the 
regional government transfers and 4) the fragmentation ratio, that is, the number of jurisdictions, since the 
more parties are involved the more decentralized the region is.  
Whether all these are the real measures to look at if we want to assess the true degree of fiscal 
decentralization in Russia? Unfortunately, all of them are not perfect. The problem with the expenditure 
decentralization is that local governments usually do not have real degree of autonomy but act on behalf of 
the regional and federal governments. Thus, relatively high (approximately 65% on average) compared to 
others countries degree of expenditure decentralization does not allow us to assess correctly the degree of 
local authority over its budgetary spending. We also have problems with the revenue side estimation of fiscal 
decentralization since those also could be not the consequence of municipal ability to rise and assign taxes, 
but the consequence of the revenue-sharing policy of regional government. 
Trying to avoid these problems we use also the share of total own2 local revenues in the total 
consolidated regional revenues. The measure gives us an idea about these municipalities’ own source 
revenue provision, that is, the possibilities of the municipalities to raise tax and non-tax revenues 
independently from the regional budgets. It is worth noting also that own revenues constitute only a very 
small part (9-10%) of the total regional revenues. This indicates a very limited autonomy of local 
                                                 
2 Own revenues – revenues which are not subject to sharing with the regional government. See appendix 1 for the detailed description 
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governments in raising tax revenues independently, but gives us necessary variation to conduct empirical 
analysis. 
We suggest that fiscal decentralization leads to lower redistribution among municipalities, since 
lower retention rates of municipalities and thus higher total amount of compensation fund and, thus, total 
transfers, witness of the higher degree of dependence from the central government (see Table 1 correlation 
tables).  
Tables 2 present the dynamics and summary statistics of the suggested decentralization measures.  
All the above tables indicate an upward trend of the degree of fiscal decentralization whether it is 
expenditure (share of municipal expenditures in the total amount of regional expenditures) or revenue (share 
of municipal revenues in the total amount of regional revenues) decentralization (the trend, however, was 
rather flat in 98-99, which could be the crisis consequence, that is, the result of the decrease of both local and 
regional revenues and expenditures). The last two tables describe the transfer side of interaction between the 
region and municipalities. The above tables show that on average from 36% till 27% of regional 
expenditures are funded with the regional transfers and from 37% till 27% of local revenues were raised as 
the transfers from regional budgets. We can observe the decreasing trend of the share of the regional aid to 
the municipalities within the region although we should take into account rather small number of 
observations in 1996. It is important that the degree of own source revenue decentralization was also 
growing since 1996, although not so rapidly, which though might witness also of the faster fall of shared 
revenues during the crisis.  
  
4. Fiscal Decentralization and Inequality  
 
It is widely accepted that fiscal decentralization could foster interjurisdictional inequality. Tiebout 
(1956) explained this by the mobility of taxpayers "voting by feet" for the tax regimes and allocating 
themselves to the jurisdictions which are most suitable to their needs. In Russia besides the growing 
inequality in living conditions in large cities and rural rayons we observe very unequal distribution of budget 
revenues across regions. In transition economies, however, it is difficult for poor people to change their 
location even if they are promised some benefits in the neighbouring jurisdiction. Thus, in transition 
economies (like Russia) there possibly exists another mechanism leading to the growing budget revenue 
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inequality and the question we am also trying to explore in this research is how decentralization enhances 
this kind of inequality and what particular mechanisms account for budget revenue inequality increase in 
Russia. 
Firstly, municipal differences, such as different tax capacities, different cost of public goods 
provision and climate peculiarities play an important role in rise of municipal inequality. Second, while 
trying to determine the effect of fiscal decentralization on the degree of budget inequality in Russian regions 
we should take into account differences in the regional industrial structure. One of the problems with Russia 
is that the years of Soviet planned economy left a great number of large unprofitable enterprises and military 
complexes after its collapse. Forced to finance their needs by themselves poor municipalities (especially 
those with military complexes on their territories) failed to increase their tax collections and tax base since 
their tax collections were primarily dependent on the state of their enterprises.  
     Given underdeveloped investment infrastructure (stock market and banking loans system which was 
nearly crashed after the crisis and was not supporting production sector even before the crisis investing in 
risky GKO) only the regions with export-oriented industries have large proceeds from export, which they can 
invest in restructuring and meet their public spending obligations increasing their tax collections. Enterprises 
need not only sufficient capital investment but also investment in municipal public infrastructure, which 
raises the marginal productivity of non-state capital. Since we suggest that degree of redistribution within a 
region is a transfer side of the degree of fiscal decentralization which is significantly negatively correlated 
with other fiscal decentralization variables, then government infrastructure investment (as well as public 
goods provision and subsidies to enterprises) indeed could improve as a result of decrease in the degree of 
public finance decentralization within the region. We make an important assumption here that the 
infrastructure investment raises marginal productivity of capital. 
While in the fully centralized regions expensive public projects with sufficient funds required could be 
undertaken (to the prejudice of other municipalities project preferences), decentralized municipalities 
sometimes cannot finance this kind of projects. When we talk about the public projects we have in mind 
infrastructure and other public projects, such as, for example, roads construction connecting municipalities, 
construction of the telephone and electricity network, sewage (we consider here exclusive infrastructure 
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projects, unlike the non-exclusive public goods such as military defence, broadcasting e t.c.) So far, some 
projects will not be undertaken because of insufficient funds needed to invest in them.  
Summarising conjectures we can think of several possible scenarios indicating how fiscal 
decentralization can lead to either more or less inequality within a region. 
1) When Fiscal Decentralization Leads to More Inequality   
• While estimating the dependence between the degree of inequality and fiscal decentralization, it is very 
important to take into account the possible market imperfections. If we suppose that poorer municipalities 
with low starting capital conditions have production functions with higher marginal productivities of capital 
and public infrastructure investment it is natural to expect that greater degree of centralization might 
compensate the low capital mobility by an increased mobility of public funds in the region. In this case 
redistribution of public funds raises the marginal productivity of non-state capital and enhances investment 
opportunities and, thus, aggregate regional growth. In this case it is possible that the effect of increased 
effectiveness of the public funds allocation could be outweighed by the negative effect, which could arise a 
result of limited ability to borrow. 
• The second possible scenario is quite common for Russian regions and could arise when the substantial part 
of municipalities are rural rayons or municipalities with poor production which are unable to provide 
themselves with substantial revenues needed to meet their spending requirements. For example, consider 
revenues and expenditures structure of  Podporozhskiy rayon which belongs to Leningradskaya oblast’. 
Equalization fund (Fond viravnivaniya) and subvention constitute approximately one third of the rayon’s 
budget (See appendix 2). This situation is typical for budgets of this level. Social spending constitutes 
approximately half of the all budgetary spending (47,7%), which means that fixed expenditures constitute a 
large part of the total municipal expenditures. This means that any interruption in the regional financing 
could results in substantial social unrest. In this case a cross-subsidisation may naturally arise since the 
regional government will try to provide the poorest municipalities with the minimum expenditure budget. In 
this case fiscal decentralization could indeed lead to the higher degree of inequality among the municipalities 
as a result of lower subsidising of poor municipalities.  
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2) When fiscal decentralization leads to less or has no any effect on inequality 
• During the Soviet period when Russia was highly centralized it was a common practice that regional 
government redistribute public funds (in the form of subsidies form the regional budget) in favour of gigantic 
enterprises maintenance, which were important for the economy of the whole country. Roughly speaking, we 
can also suggest that regional governments cares not very much about inequality among municipalities and 
were demonstrating predatory behaviour towards those municipalities not having large industrial centres on 
their territories and, in contrast, were supporting several large industrial complexes. Moreover, regional 
administration could redistribute funds to the more wealthy municipalities as it, for example, wants to 
maintain the high level of employment at the large enterprises. Thus, in this case decentralization could lead 
to less inequality among municipalities. 
• In case when enterprises are more uniformly distributed across a region, we face a number of municipalities 
that in principle are similar to each other and are able to provide themselves with the basic needs. In this case 
the benefits resulting from the better management of local enterprises and more efficient allocation of public 
funds could outweigh or be fully compensated by the possible losses which occur as a result of decreased 
mobility of public funds. In this case we will see no significant effect of fiscal decentralization. 
The overall effect of fiscal decentralization on the welfare of Russian regions is not obvious. The 
structure of the regions differs across the country. For example, region can include a) mostly rural 
municipalities with only a little production and small tax base; b) municipalities with high productive 
potential which, although currently in a quite depressed state, could restructure their enterprises and increase 
tax collection under some circumstances, and, finally, c) municipalities with large industrial complexes on 
their territories, with the large share of taxes in the regional budget withheld from this kind enterprises. If 
regions include mostly municipalities with high production potential and municipalities with poor production 
which are unable to provide themselves with substantial revenues needed to meet their spending 
requirements then we can expect that the increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization will lead to the 
growing inequality in the region. 
 
5. Measuring budget revenue inequality among municipalities 
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In order to estimate the degree of revenue inequality among municipalities I use the following local 
budget items: 
-  total revenues  (includes all the tax revenues of the municipality, non-tax revenues, total revenues from the 
earmarked budget funds)        
-  Grand total revenues (besides total revenues includes subsidies, subventions and transfers received from 
the regional budgets; includes subsidies, subventions and transfers, received from raions’ and cities budgets, 
and also mutual settlements, including compensations for additional expenditures that resulted from 
mandates, from regional and also from municipal budgets) 
- total expenditures (including expenditures on the main budget items) 
- grand total expenditures (besides total expenditures includes subsidies, subventions and transfers given out 
to the regional budgets; includes subsidies, subventions and transfers, given out to raions’ and cities budgets, 
and also mutual settlements, including compensations for additional expenditures that resulted from 
mandates, given out to regional and also to municipal budgets) 
 - own revenues (composed from the budget revenue items which are not subject to sharing with the budgets 
of the upper levels - see Appendix 1). 
In order to take into account different costs of public goods provision in the regions (in both income 
and expenditures inequality measures) we deflated budgetary revenues so that to compare them not only by 
years but also among regions dividing budgetary revenues by the cost of basket in the region.  
For measuring budget revenue inequality among municipalities in the region I adopt the following 
coefficients: 
[1]  index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal budgetary revenue (without transfers) 
[2]  index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal expenditures 
[3]  index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal budgetary revenue 
[4]  index Gini constructed by "own source" income provision of municipalities (percent of own     
            revenues in the total amount of municipal revenues)  
[5]  share of average per capita total revenues of the top richest 20% municipalities to the average per   
            capita total revenues of the 20% poorest municipalities 
     [6]  index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal output  
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  What inequality measure more or less reflects the inequality in the real abilities of municipal 
authorities to collect budget funds? Measures [1] and [2] are quite similar to each other since budget 
expenditures are usually closely follow after-transfers budget receipts which is a direct consequence of a 
very depressed state of municipalities. After-transfers revenue is almost always barely enough to cover all 
the obligatory expenditures, which imply low savings level in municipalities. Table 3 indeed shows that the 
Gini indexes [1] and [2] are close to each other. [3] measures inequality of per capita total municipal 
budgetary revenues without equalizing transfers which more truly reflects the real ability of municipal 
authorities to collect budget funds. Unsurprisingly Gini index increases almost twice as much if measured by 
the per capita municipal budget revenues without transfers. Measure [3], however, do not exclude the 
redistribution of regulating shared taxes within a region, thus, we also construct measure [4] - index Gini 
constructed by "own source" income provision of municipalities (per capita own municipal revenues). [6] 
measures per capita output inequality and serves as a proxy for inequality of municipal tax bases.     
      The tables below represent the average values of these inequality measures by years. According to the 
inequality measures presented in the table inequality within municipalities was steadily (almost always) 
growing. The table also shows that indeed the distribution of own revenues across the region is more unequal 
(by 0.02-0.03 higher on average) then the distribution of total revenues (including also part of shared 
revenues). This indicates that regional and local transfers do an important job in equalizing the per capita 
budget revenues within a region. Revenue redistribution reduces municipal inequality from 0.3 to 0.16. We 
failed to reveal significantly increasing trend in Gini indexes constructed by per capita after transfers local 
expenditures and revenues, which are both approximately at the same level with expenditures inequality 
being by 0.02-0.03 higher. This could be a signal that regional government tries to keep the degree of budget 
revenue inequality among municipalities at the constant level.  
The table shows that Index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal revenues (without transfers) 
increases steadily and by 1999 it rose by almost 14%. The table indicates also that the ratio of average per 
capita total revenues of the top richest 20% municipalities to the average per capita total revenues of the 20% 
poorest municipalities was also increasing during 1996-1998 and finally rose by approximately 20%, which 
means that the lag between per capita incomes of the richest and the poorest municipalities was steadily 
increasing. This may be a signal that rich municipalities were becoming even richer and poor municipalities 
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were becoming even poorer since 1996. However, this index fell sharply in 1999. Table 4 summarises per 
capita revenues in the groups of the 20% municipalities with highest per capita total regional revenues and 
20% with the lowest per capita revenues. 
What is the main source of the inequality among municipalities? At first, differences among the 
types of municipalities. It is widely known that living conditions are very different in rural rayons and cities. 
Large cities unlike rayons serve as education and economic centres and attract capital, investment and labour 
force. Table 5 shows that in 1996 total municipal revenue per capita in cities was approximately twice as 
much as rayons' total revenue per capita and this ratio rose in 1997 and in 1998 the total municipal revenue 
in cities became three times greater than in rayons. As for total revenue per capita (including transfers) for 
cities it was approximately maximum 1.5 times greater if compared with the same figure for rayons. For 
cities excluding the main city values are still higher than that for rayons. Thus, we imply that cities are on 
average indeed wealthier than rayons and in mass demonstrate higher levels of revenues per capita.    
Inequality exists not only between the different types of the municipalities but also among the 
municipalities within each group. Table 6 compares revenue inequality among cities and among rayons and 
shows that although on average cities are much more wealthy than rayons, the former, however, demonstrate 
higher disparity in their per capita revenues. This implies that cities are more similar in their revenue 
structure than rayons. The result is independent of whether we include main cities or not. Inequality was 
steadily growing during the three years under consideration. Inequality among the cities was growing less 
rapidly than inequality among rayons, that is, by 10% as compared with 20% for rayons.  
Thus, we can suggest, that high inequality among municipalities is a result of very unequal 
distribution of production across regions, that is, high industrial concentration. We suggest that the majority 
of regions subsidise poor municipalities just because of their depressed state and the overall effect of 
increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization on the degree of inequality within the region is positive for 
the regions with high concentration ratio. We suggest that the effect should be lower for the regions with low 
industrial concentration ratio, that is, for the regions with approximately uniform distribution of enterprises. 
High industrial concentration ratio in the region means that the region includes both municipalities 
with high and low returns on capital and public infrastructure investment. We suggest that those 
municipalities with low returns on capital possess the sufficient amount of capital so that to demonstrate low 
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returns on private investment. Russia indeed demonstrates high industrial concentration ratio. Thus, we 
suggest that this could also account for fiscal decentralization leading to more adverse effect than it could be 
expected to be a result of this kind of policy as compared to its effect in other countries.   
 Trying to estimate industry concentration ratio we use the following proxies: 
♦ the ratio of the output of one percent of the largest enterprises (those with the highest output) to the total 
regional output 
♦ enterprise Herfindahl index measured as the sum of squared shares of the enterprise output to the total 
regional output 
♦ municipal Herfindahl index measured analogously to the enterprise Herfindahl index except for the fact 
that xi is the share of the output per capita of i’s municipality in the cumulative output of all the 
municipalities. 
The last two measures are different. The first one do not take into account distribution of enterprises by 
municipalities and it gives us an idea about the concentration of production (which can be concentrated in 
fact in several municipalities), the second coefficient measures, meanwhile, the concentration of production 
in municipalities. Table 7 represents the average values of the regional industry concentration ratios. 
 
6. Does inequality lead to lower growth rates? 
Why is it so important to understand how fiscal decentralization influences inequality both among 
people and among municipalities? First of all, economic literature emphasises the strong relation between the 
level of inequality and growth rates. This relationship between growth and inequality has been a subject of 
considerable debate in resent years. Moreover, our aim is not only to find out how fiscal decentralization 
influences the gap between the poorest and wealthiest municipalities, but also to find out whether 
decentralization is retarding growth in poor municipalities. 
There are several papers concerning the inequality among people. A traditional view is that higher 
inequality is associated with higher rates of growth. Kuznets (1955) presented evidence of U - shaped 
relationship between inequality and per capita GDP, which he interpreted as the evidence that inequality 
increases in the early stages of development and decreases thereafter. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) also 
described empirically the relations between inequality and the growth rates in cross-country data. They  
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show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: changes in inequality 
(in any directions) are associated with reduced rate of growth in the next period. Barro (1999) shows that 
higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries and encourage growth in richer places. The most 
resent empirical works suggest a negative correlation between inequality and growth rates (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994). This could happen by showing that redistributive transfers can enhance growth in an 
environment characterised by significant liquidity constraints. Perotti (1996) found empirical support for the 
view that redistribution can enhance growth by fostering socio-political stability.   
Although the above papers’ concern is mainly income inequality among people we suggest that  
municipal inequality follows the same pattern as inequality among people while influencing the growth rate 
of the region. The hypothesis that we are going to test is that higher inequality may lead to the lower rates of 
growth. In the second part of the research we will try to find out what kind of dependence could be observed 
between inequality and growth in Russia and understand the reasons for correlation of this particular sign.  
While estimating the dependence between the degree of inequality, decentralization and growth rates 
in the region, it is very important to take into account the possible market imperfections. For example, 
Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) show that revenue inequality may be bad for growth, in 
particular, when capital markets are imperfect and agents are heterogeneous or when some agents suffer 
from institutional limitations in the access to investment. This means, that the same mechanisms as those 
leading to the increasing inequality within a region could also account for the decrease in the aggregated 
regional growth. Actually, explaining the possible dependence between decentralization, inequality and 
growth, we can imagine two possible scenarios.  
Suppose that each region includes both wealthy and relatively poor municipalities with different 
starting initial conditions. All the municipalities differ in their growth potential and aggregate productivity 
depending also on the state of municipal enterprises.  
If we suggest that poor regions with the low initial capital conditions indeed grow faster if compared 
with those more wealthy ones (which simply could be a result of the decreasing marginal return on capital 
and public investment) then fiscal decentralization accompanied by capital market imperfections (which 
include impossibility for poor municipalities to borrow money in the regional banks and at the capital 
markets) could indeed lead to increase in inequality and decrease in the regional growth rates. In this case 
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redistribution of public funds raises the marginal productivity of non-state capital and enhances investment 
opportunities and thus aggregate regional growth. 
  From the other hand, according to Barro (1999) we can suggest that higher inequality tends to retard 
growth in poor municipalities and encourage growth in richer ones, which means that we actually know 
nothing about the budget revenue inequality effect on the growth rates of the whole region. This could 
happen, that the effect of poorer municipalities outweighs the effect of more wealthy ones and inequality will 
be, thus, bad for the overall regional growth. It is an empirical question which of the effects will dominate. 
 
7. The model 
The simple model presented here is aimed at demonstrating the process of emerging of inequality 
between municipalities as a result of fiscal decentralization policy. It also attempts to show that immobility 
of capital plays an important role in the budget revenue inequality provoking. Moreover, the regional 
industrial concentration matters while influencing the degree of budget revenue inequality among 
municipalities.  
 
The main assumptions of the model 
♦ For simplicity we assume that there are only two municipalities with the initial capital endowments E1 
and E2, where E1 > E2, that is, the first municipality is initially a more wealthy one, municipalities have 
the same population and labor force is immobile across the municipalities   
♦ Each municipality has its own production function, which is the aggregate production function of several 
enterprises, convex function of private and public investment - capital K and infrastructure investment 
G: f = f(K, G), fK’>0, fG’>0, fK’>0, fKK’’<0, fKG’’>0 
♦ the output of municipality is determined by the value of its production function, that is Q = f(K, G) 
♦ the budget of municipality equals the tax rate τ multiplied by the total industrial output Q = f(K, G), that 
is, B = τ f(K, G) 
♦ degree of fiscal decentralization is parameterized by λ, the share of taxes which the municipal 
governments can retain.  
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Local governments. Since fiscal decentralization gives to municipality better access to local 
information, possibilities to allocate public funds more efficiently and incentives for better management of 
municipal enterprises we suggest that in the fully decentralized region local governments use public funds 
more efficiently. Thus, local public funds used in the production process are included in the production 
function multiplied by the coefficient α, which accounts for the increased effectiveness of the use of locally 
collected taxes (public funds). That is, locally collected public funds are included in the production function 
multiplied by α, where α is greater than 1 (α > 1). This ensures that fiscal decentralization influences the 
output elasticity to public production inputs. In case of full decentralization municipality i’s production 
functions will be f(Ki, αgi), where gi is the locally collected funds. Under gi we understand mostly 
infrastructure investment (development of the stock market, building of roads) and exclusive for other 
municipalities public goods influencing productivity of municipalities. If we suggest that private funds are 
immobile, then the initial capital endowment of municipality i equals Ei and does not change over time.  
Besides the productive public goods municipal government is able to transfer budget funds in the form of 
subsidies Si to population (unproductive subsidies). Although also used more efficiently if provided by the 
local government, public funds do not take part in the formation of the next year municipality i budget.  
Municipality i gets utility V(αSi) from the amount Si allocated as subsidies. V(.) is assumed strictly 
increasing and concave. If we suggest that poor municipality with E2 < E1 values subsidies more than the 
benefits received as a result of the production process, then its marginal utility from one more unit of 
subsidies to households is greater then the marginal utility from one more unit of production. In more 
wealthy municipalities, in contrast, it is natural to expect that marginal utility of production (which positively 
depends on E1) could be greater then marginal utility from one more unit of public funds transferred to 
households in the form of subsidies. 
The municipality i’s utility function positively and additively depends on the total amount of transfers Si, 
provided locally, and the total industrial output. We suggest that the utility function of municipality i is equal 
to  
Ui = f(Ei0, αgi) + V(αSi) 
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All the available money municipality can either input in production in the form of productive public goods 
and infrastructure investment (gi) or spend them unproductively (Si). 
Central government. Suppose that central government is a utilitarian one, but cares also about 
inequality among municipalities. Thus, we suggest that the goal of the central government is to maximize the 
welfare function of the whole region, which depends both on the total welfare of municipalities and also puts 
some weigh on the distance between the utility functions of municipalities.  
W( U1, U2 ) = U1 + U2 - θ (U1 - U2) = (1-θ)U1 + (1+θ)U2, 
where θ < 1, U1 > U2. θ is the coefficient indicating the extent to which the central government bothers about 
inequality, higher θ means higher weight imposed on inequality issues.  
Central government has the authority to redistribute public funds. Thus, central government collects an 
amount of taxes equal to the tax rate τ multiplied by the total amount of municipal output from each 
municipality, and then reallocates the funds collected back to local governments by means of subsidies SiG  to 
households and funds aimed at the productive public goods and infrastructure provision Gi. We suggest here 
that central government gives to municipalities targeted subsidies, that is, it can directly control the use of the 
funds transferred to municipalities. 
Thus, taking Si* and gi* of municipalities as given the central government maximizes  
Wc = (1-θ)U1 + (1+θ)U2  =   
i
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where 1-λ is a share of taxes which is transferred to the central regional budget, whereas λ  goes to the 
municipal budget and Bi = Bi(λ,α,gi,Gi,Ei) is a budget of municipality i, ψi = 1-θ, ψi = 1+θ. 
Municipalities solve their own problem given the choices of other local governments and given the 
expectations of the rule determining SiG and Gi from the central government. 
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Si + gi  ≤  λBi0  = λτ f(Ei0, αgi + Gi* ) 
Equilibrium. We consider sequential interaction between the central government and local 
governments. In principle, we can consider the two cases. The first case realizes when local government 
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moves first and central government acts as follower, which could happen if municipality chooses what 
expenditures to finance and then central government bails it out if needed. The second case realizes when 
central government makes the decision first and local government accommodates. We are going to consider 
the model within the second framework, that is, we consider the case of no accommodation, when central 
government moves before the local governments, since this scenario seems to be more appropriate for 
Russia. We suppose, that central government allocates transfers according probably to the previous year’s 
municipal budget revenues, but in the current year they are determined before the actual choices of the 
municipal governments are known to the central government. The equilibrium of the above game will be the 
set of strategies of local and central governments, such that no one agent has incentives to deviate 
unilaterally.   
 The model gives us an opportunity to investigate a trade-off caused by decentralization policy. If the 
degree of decentralization increases (λ goes up) then regional welfare rises since public funds are used more 
effectively (which could lead to an increasing inequality), but at the same time, if λ goes up then (1-λ) goes 
down and regional welfare decreases as a result of the limited ability of the centre to redistribute public 
funds. The model will allow us to make conclusions about the several issues we are concerned with.  
 
1) Budgetary revenue inequality 
Using the model we can compare the municipal budget revenue inequality for different values of λ and 
analyse how the budget revenue inequality changes with λ. Thus, what we need to look at is the sign of the 
derivative (τf1- τf2)’λ(λ). If E1 > E2 and the derivative is positive, then the degree of fiscal decentralization 
within a region provokes inequality among municipalities.  
Assume that production function of municipality i has the form Fi = ϕi(Ki)f(αgi+Gi). Since we assume 
first that capital is immobile, then Fi = Eif(αgi+Gi). Function Vi is assumed to be linear Vi = ai (αSi +SiG). In 
this case from first-order conditions (see appendix), assuming first interior solution, we obtain that ∀ i=1,2 
 
 Thus, the gap between the municipal budgets is equal to  
i
ii
i
ii
ґ
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Thus, if E1 > E2 and the derivative Gλ’ > 0, then the gap between the two municipalities budgets even 
increases and budget inequality increases with λ. 
In order to get an explicit solution for the optimal choice of the central government subsidies, we need to 
make further assumptions about the preferences of municipalities. To ensure that the problem has a solution 
we assume the specific Cobb-Douglas form of the municipality i’s utility function Fi(Ki,gi,Gi) = Kiαi 
(αgi+Gi)1-αi, α1 = β, α2 = γ. Assuming as before that the amount of capital is fixed and equals to the initial 
capital endowment, we obtain the following expression 
 
Whether the gap between the municipalities budgets increasing or decreasing depends on the sign of the 
following derivative. If the derivative, evaluated at an extreme point λ = 1, is greater then zero, then Gλ’ > 0 
∀λ > 0. The formal solutions see in appendix 3.  
The sign of the derivative is clearly depending on the set of parameters, such as the slopes of the 
production functions, initial endowments of the municipalities and ai, municipality i’s valuation of 
unproductive subsidies.  
Comparative statics:   
• The form of the production function. The lower is the coefficient β, (that is, the higher is 1-β), the 
more the potential increase in the municipality output and, thus, the potential increase in the poor 
municipalitiy’s budget is. Indeed, greater 1-β means sufficiently high marginal increase in output caused in 
the increase in the public funds redistributed. The inequality Gλ’ > 0 is more likely to be satisfied, the greater 
is the difference between coefficients β and γ. If β >> γ, then it is more optimal to increase the level of 
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decentralization and leave higher amount of budget revenues to the poorer municipalities, since this will lead 
to the higher output growth. 
• Industrial concentration 
One more question we can explore with the help of the model presented is how industrial concentration 
influences the degree of inequality among municipalities. That is, our goal is to compare the degree of 
municipal inequality for regions with different degrees of industrial concentration ratio E1/E2.  It is easy to 
see that the greater the ratio E1/E2 is the greater is the gap between the municipalities’ budgets. That is, for 
every λ > 0, degree of fiscal decentralization, the gap G(λ) is increasing in the ratio E1/E2, which is greater 
than 1 if E1 > E2. 
• Municipality valuation of unproductive transfers. If we suggest that poor municipalities value 
transfers to households more than productive public goods then local government will allocate less funds to 
the production purposes and will allocate more funds as unproductive transfers to population. For the more 
wealthy municipalities this will act in the opposite way. That is, if they are valuing unproductive transfers 
much less that the possible gains from production, then it would be optimal to allocate public funds to the 
production needs, which is more likely to be satisfied if E1 is sufficiently high and β >> γ. Keeping β, γ, a1 
fixed, we obtain that the gap is more likely to increase if the poor municipality valuation of unproductive 
transfers increases. Intuitively, the higher is the poor municipalities’ valuation for the unproductive 
subsidies, the more optimal it is to distribute public funds among the population instead of allocating them 
on the production purposes. Thus, fewer funds will be allocated to the formation of the next year’s budget, 
which eventually decreases municipality’s budget and increases gap between units. 
• Effectiveness of the use of public funds 
Given the values a1 and a2 fixed, such that a1< a2, and β >> γ, the condition Gλ’ > 0 is less likely to be 
satisfied if the effectiveness of the use of public funds α is higher. Indeed, if for the poor municipalities the 
potential increase in the productivity as a result of additional public funds allocated on production is high 
enough, then decentralization itself is more important. It is more optimal to give to municipalities the 
opportunity to decide upon the use of public funds independently, since it would realise in the higher social 
wealth and lower inequality. 
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2) Welfare inequality 
Since the changes in the degree of budget revenue inequality as a result of the increase in the degree of 
fiscal decentralization does not necessarily characterise changes in the welfare inequality, this question is 
addressed as a separate issue. Since increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization leads to the more 
efficient use of public funds and, at the same time, to the lower public sector resources for the poor 
municipalities the overall impact remains uncertain. The difference between the two types of inequality 
is that if municipality values unproductive transfers a lot, then, although central government would not 
direct resources to the production sector and would not try to develop the production sector in the 
municipality (and municipality by itself has very low incentives to develop the production sector), it can 
allocate sufficient amount of funds in the form of unproductive subsidies (we suggest that municipality 
cares about inequality)  
Trying to analyse the model we again imply the worst case for the wealthier municipality, that is, that the 
regional government transfers all the equalizing fund to the poorest municipality budget. (See appendix 4 
for the details.) We say that fiscal decentralization leads to the increase in the degree of welfare 
inequality if 0/)( 21 >∂−∂ λWW , where welfare W is now measured as the sum of unproductive 
transfers and the total value of the enterprise output.   
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BkAk 21 > , that is, the poorest municipality can not catch up with the more wealthy one since the 
increase in output in the more wealthy municipality due to the increased effectiveness of the use of 
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public funds increases more then the welfare of the poorest municipality due to the increase in 
unproductive transfers (authorities get less share of  revenue, but the revenue itself is increasing).   
Comparative statics:   
• Municipality valuation of unproductive transfers. If poor municipalities value transfers to 
households more than productive public goods then local government will allocate less funds to the 
production purposes and will allocate more funds as unproductive transfers to population. For the more 
wealthy municipalities this will act in the opposite way. However, central government will allocate more 
unproductive transfers to the municipality with the highest valuation of transfers, which will potentially lead 
to the lower municipal inequality (in case if poorer municipality has lower valuation of transfers). Thus, in 
contrast to the previous case, (budget revenue inequality is higher the higher is the unproductive transfers 
valuation of the poorest municipality), high unproductive transfers valuation of the poorest municipality 
leads to the lower degree of welfare inequality between municipalities. This observation can possibly mean 
that if the both welfare and budget revenue inequality both matter and regional government cares about both 
with some particular weights then there exists the optimal value of λ, the share of taxes withheld by the local 
units.  
• Industrial concentration 
We again try to compare the degree of municipal inequality for regions with different degrees of 
industrial concentration ratio E1/E2.  It is easy to see that the greater the ratio E1/E2 is the greater is the gap 
between the municipalities’ welfare. That is, for every λ > 0, degree of fiscal decentralization, the gap is 
increasing in the ratio E1/E2, which is greater than 1 if E1 > E2. 
• The form of the production function. 
The lower is α2, that is, the elasticity of output to the private inputs (the higher is the elasticity of output to 
the public inputs), the more likely it is that the increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization will lead to the 
increase in the degree of welfare inequality among the municipalities. The inequality is more likely to be 
satisfied, the greater is the difference between coefficients β and γ. 
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3) Capital mobility 
We suggest that λ is set by the central (federal) government which observes only the outcome – the 
optimal value of the social welfare function W*(λ) and is able to determine the optimal value of λ so that to 
maximise the social welfare. It is important to compare the optimal degrees of decentralization for imperfect 
capital markets λim and unconstraint capital mobility λperf. The model is aimed to show that optimal degree of 
decentralization for imperfect capital markets could be lower than that for perfect capital markets, that is, λim 
< λperf since for some of the regions (in particular, those regions where poor municipalities have a potential to 
grow faster if they are able to borrow at the capital market) inequality will be reduced as a result of the 
possibility of poor municipalities to borrow. This means, that the redistribution by means of public funds will 
be less important.  
Suppose now that after the outcome of the game is realised and central government chose the optimal 
values of unproductive transfers and infrastructure investment. Moreover, observing the outcome, federal 
government assigns the optimal retention rates λ*, that is, the degree of fiscal decentralization within all the 
regions. In order to support our claim we will show that under certain conditions for every degree of fiscal 
decentralization λ*, budget revenue inequality will be lower under the condition that the capital can flow 
freely among the municipalities.  
Suppose now that the capital immobility condition is relaxed and capital, although not freely mobile, 
can, however, flow between the municipalities. In order to model the partial capital constraint, we suppose, 
that the share δ (δ > 0) of the initial capital endowment of each municipality is mobile and can be traded at 
the capital market, market interest rate is equal to r. The share 1-δ of the capital endowments is, however, 
immobile. Thus, private funds are traded at the market without any regulation of the central government, the 
only the possibility of which to influence the capital flows is by changing the marginal productivity of 
private funds through the decentralization policy. Besides that, redistribution of unproductive subsidies does 
not influence the decision of municipalities concerning the redistribution of private funds, thus, we are free 
to suggest, the worst case fore the more wealthy government, that is, regional government transfers all the 
public funds available to the poorer municipality budget. For formalities see appendix 3. 
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Municipality 2 maximizes: 
 
Part of the capital is not mobile K1 ≤ δE1, and K2 ≤ δE2, and we can immediately plug Ki ≤ δEi into the 
utility functions of municipalities. The other part of the capital is mobile across the region and we thus can 
impose the following constraint: 
K1’ + K2’ ≤ (1-δ)(E1 + E2) 
 Denote the coefficient before K1 in the first municipality’s utility function as s1(a1,α,γ,λ*,τ) and the 
coefficient before K2 in the second municipality’s utility function as s2(a2,α,γ,λ,τ), s*(a2,a1,α,γ,λ*,τ) - over 
constants. Thus we have 
K1’* = argmax {s1(a1,α,γ,λ*,τ)δE1 + K1’(s1(a1,α,γ,λ*,τ) - r)}  
K2’* = argmax {s2(a2,α,γ,λ*,τ)δE2 + K2’(s2(a2,α,γ,λ*,τ) - r) + s*(a2,a1,α,γ,λ*,τ)}  
          s.t. K1’ + K2’ ≤ (1-δ)(E1 + E2) 
Consider two important cases here. First, s1(a1,α,γ,λ*,τ) < r < s2(a2,α,γ,λ*,τ), thus, K1’*= 0 and more 
wealthy municipality prefers lending, K2’* = (1-δ)(E1 + E2). In this case the gap between the municipalities 
budgets decreasing as a result of increase in δ, degree of capital mobility.  
 
The result is more likely to hold when γ is sufficiently low, so that 1-γ and 1/γ are sufficiently high, and 
the efficiency of the use of public funds is quite high, so that  
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Intuitively, low γ means that marginal productivity of public funds is sufficiently high. Thus, the central 
government can influence the marginal productivity of private funds and capital flows through the 
decentralization policy, decreasing thus the degree of budget revenue inequality, since it would be more 
optimal if the poorer municipality has a higher growth potential. Thus, under these conditions, for any 
positive λ, the higher will be the degree of capital mobility δ, the lower will be inequality among 
municipalities.  
 
8. Main hypotheses and methodology 
Basing on the predictions of the presented theoretical model, we formulated several hypotheses, which have 
to be tested empirically.  
Hypothesis 1: The increase in the level of within-region fiscal decentralization increases inequality among 
municipalities. 
The alternative hypothesis is that fiscal decentralization have no or small negative influence on the degree of 
revenue inequality within a region. To test the hypothesis we estimate the following fixed-effects model 
Yit  = αi + γt + β*Xit + γ*Zit + µit, 
H0: β > 0, Ha: β ≤ 0 
where Yit is a regional inequality coefficient, Xit - region i's decentralization measuring coefficients vector,  
αi are regional fixed effects, γt are the year's dummies and µit disturbance terms, Zit - vector of controls. 
Panel data allows us to take into account changes not only across municipalities but also over time. 
Municipality-specific effects in the regressions allow controlling for unobservable municipality-specific 
differences, which do not depend on time but may affect dependent variables. Year dummies help to control 
for systematic changes in the degree of fiscal decentralization of all municipalities in particular year. This is 
important if the federal law mandates public expenditures form the federal and regional to the local level.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The increase in the level of within-region fiscal decentralization increases welfare 
inequality among municipalities. 
Hypothesis 3:  Capital market imperfection leads to the higher degree of inequality among municipalities.  
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Hypothesis 4: Industry concentration ratio matters while determining the dependence between the level of 
decentralization and degree of municipal inequality. In the regions with sufficiently high industrial 
concentration ratio inequality among municipalities increases as a result of the increase in the degree of 
fiscal decentralization to a greater extent than in the regions with low concentration ratio. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 concern the choice of controls, that is, the empirical model tests whether given the same 
level of fiscal decentralization regions with higher industrial concentration ratio and greater capital market 
imperfections will demonstrate more unequal distribution of per capita budget revenues across region.  
The alternative to the Hypothesis 3 is that in the regions with sufficiently high industrial concentration ratio 
fiscal decentralization leads to lower inequality since the whole region stops subsidising several most 
productive enterprises.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The degree of fiscal decentralization is negatively correlated with the overall performance 
and growth of poor municipalities. That is, increase in the degree of decentralization could lead not only 
to the increase in the performance gap between poor and wealthy municipalities within a region, but also 
to the even poor performance of backward municipalities and even better performance of wealthy ones. 
Thus, fiscal decentralization could even lead to the decrease in the growth rates of the whole regions. 
The alternative hypothesis is that fiscal decentralization have no or small negative influence on the growth of 
poor municipalities. To test the hypothesis we estimate the following fixed-effects model: 
Fit  = αi + γt + β*Xit + γ*Git + µit, 
H0: β < 0, HA: β ≥ 0 
besides that Fit now is a municipal growth coefficient (municipal budget revenue growth) and Git - region i's 
inequality measuring coefficient, αi are regional fixed effects, γt are the year's dummies and µit disturbance 
terms, Zit - vector of variables that should be controlled for (as the factors possibly influencing the regional 
growth and municipal).  
      The main difficulty that dramatically complicates the analysis of the effects of fiscal decentralization 
on the regional performance, is its possible endogeneity. Fiscal decentralisation could also be a consequence 
of regional policy depending on a number of factors specific to the particular region. This could be an 
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attitude of the governor intentionally increasing the level of decentralization because of his unwillingness to 
take responsibility over municipalities, hardening municipal and enterprise budget constraints which could 
possibly lead to a higher degree of decentralization, or, in contrast, protecting municipal enterprises from the 
federal tax agencies in exchange to the tax payments to the regional budget (Treisman, 1999). 
      Favouring investment climate (including rule of law and investors' rights protection) can also be 
attributed to the regional policy and attract foreign direct investment in the loss-making enterprises.   
 
 
9. Data 
 
To estimate the degree of fiscal decentralization within regions we used the unique municipal 
budgets data set, which consists of the complete budgets of 2118 municipalities from 73 regions. The data set 
also contains consolidated and own budgets of the regions. The database was constructed from the 1996-99 
municipal budget panel data provided and gathered by Georgia State University. Year 1999 data was 
provided by the Centre for Fiscal Policy. The panel is unbalanced, but we have at least three years worth of 
data for each municipality. Regional annual budgetary data was obtained from the Ministry of Finance 
sources. It includes the total amount of local budget’s expenditures and revenues since 1992. The data is 
available for 88 regions excluding Chechnya.  
Besides the municipal budgets database we use Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Data 
RERLD which has been prepared from the GosKomStat enterprise data. 
The source of social-economic factors is 1999 Editions of GosKomStat Annual Publication. Some 
figures and social indicators are, however, not available for the nine Autonomous Areas, which reduces the 
sample size. 
 
10. Sample  
 
The median number of municipalities in each region amounts to 33 (including both cities and 
rayons), the average is approximately 35. The median number of cities is 8 and the median number of rayons 
is 24. Each region contains one main city – its capital. All the main cities in the data available in sum account 
for approximately 34% of all population.  
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According to the RELDR data, the overall output of municipalities with budgets available account 
for approximately 81% of all regional output and for approximately 84% of all regional employment. This 
means that the sample is covering all the most important municipalities. 
 
Table 1: Regional (average) structure description  
 
Type of 
municipality 
Total number Percentage of total Median number Percent of 
population 
Rayons 1551 73,2% 24 63% 
Cities 565 26.7% 8 37% 
Total 2118 100% 33 100% 
 
 
 
11. Results. Discussion. 
Hypothesis 1: The increase in the level of within-region fiscal decentralization increases 
inequality among municipalities.  
Trying to demonstrate a robust relationship between fiscal decentralization and inequality we 
estimated fixed effects model including in the RHS of the regression equation proxies for fiscal 
decentralization and in the LHS different proxies for budget revenue inequality among municipalities. Since 
it is impossible to capture all the factors that determine the systematic differences among the regions in the 
degree of inequality among municipalities, we can just try to capture the stable differences including region 
fixed effects in the model. The Hausman test also shows that the random-effects specification is not 
appropriate here for the estimation of regression coefficients. 
To avoid the multicollinearity effect we estimate several equations including in the regressions all 
the decentralization measures separately (all the measures are highly correlated, see table 1). For example, 
expenditure and revenue decentralization measures are correlated with the coefficient 0.68. To obtain a 
robust relationship between the inequality and within the region degree of decentralization we run 16 
regressions for all the types of the inequality measures and measures for budget revenue inequality among 
municipalities. We do not run regressions with the fragmentation ration decentralization measure since there 
is no variation in the coefficient across time. 
Besides the variables accounting for the degree of fiscal decentralization we also include in the 
regression equation several control variables. Inequality among municipalities to a greater extent is a result 
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of differences in tax capacities of the municipalities, climate peculiarities and other social, economic and 
institutional factors. Per capita budgetary revenue in municipality is strongly correlated with municipal tax 
base; thus, differences in per capita budgetary revenues in municipalities could be explained by the 
differences in the municipal tax capacities. We suggest that inequality in the municipal outputs per capita can 
serve as the proxy for the differences in municipal tax bases. In order to control for initial inequality 
conditions in the region we construct inequality Gini index based on the municipal outputs per capita and 
include a lagged value of the index in the regression equation. It is natural to expect that this index should 
explain a great part of the variation in the inequality index based on the per capita municipal incomes.  
Besides the output inequality index we expect that wealth of the whole region could also influence 
the degree of municipal inequality within a region. In order to test whether capital market imperfection 
indeed lead to the more growing inequality, we also include in the regression equation the proxy for the 
possibility of the banking financing at the regional level (we suggest, that the possibilities of borrowing by 
issuing debt or equity are quite limited). We first estimated the total amount of credits given out to 
enterprises by bunks during the year in the region by taking the difference between the amount of given out 
credits to enterprises at the end of the period and credits at the beginning of the period. The proxy was 
constructed as the ratio of the total amount of credits given out to enterprises by bunks during the year and 
and total budgetary revenues. We also include in the regression equation municipal Herfindahl index 
constructed as the sum of squared shares of the municipalities’ output in the total regional output. 
The results of fixed effects estimation for several inequality measures are reported in Tables 10 and 
11. Regressions include the full set of year dummies and indicate that increase in the degree of fiscal 
decentralization in either way (no matter whether we look at the inequality measured by revenue or 
expenditure side) is accompanied by an increase in the degree of budget inequality among municipalities. In 
particular, increase in the degree of expenditure decentralization by 10% leads to the increase in the degree 
of inequality among the municipal budgets by approximately 0.02-0.026, and increase in the degree of 
revenue decentralization by 10% leads to the 0.026-0.03 increase in the degree of inequality.  
The wealth of the region is also significant in explaining municipal budget revenue inequality; it 
negatively influences the degree of per capita total budget revenue inequality, total revenue with transfers 
and own revenues inequality within region. The possible explanation is that the wealthier the region the more 
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possibilities it has for redistribution. Moreover, the more wealthy the region is, the more wealthy 
municipalities are on average, which means that some of the poorer municipalities with high growth 
potential might not be constrained in there investment policy. We consider the average wage rate in the 
region as a proxy of the wealth of the region. Results do not change if we include in the regression GDP per 
capita or per capita total municipal budgetary revenue as proxies.  
Unexpectedly, the lagged inequality of the municipal outputs (which we were using as a proxy for 
the initial conditions, that is, inequality of the tax base distribution over the region) negatively influences the 
next year degree of inequality within a region. One possible explanation for this result is that regional 
authorities indeed try to regulate the inequality within a region. That is, more unequal output distribution 
across the region leads to the more equalizing assignment of shared taxes by the regional authorities. 
However, cross-section correlation (without any time-series effect) is positive (0.35) and significant, which 
means that indeed, the more unequal the tax bases distribution was in the region the higher will be the next 
year budget revenues inequality in this region compared to other ones. In contrast, the higher industrial 
concentration in the region is, the higher is the increase in the degree of municipal budgets inequality. The 
10% increase of the municipal Herfindahl index leads approximately to the 0.05 increase inequality among 
municipalities within the region. Indeed, it is natural to expect that the more concentrated production is in the 
region, the more important are the redistribution and borrowing issues in the region. High industrial 
concentration ratio in the region means that the region includes both municipalities with high and low returns 
on capital and public infrastructure investment. We suggest that those municipalities with low returns on 
capital possess the sufficient amount of capital and thus are willing to lend at the capital market, while those 
municipalities with high potential growth rates would be in contrast willing to borrow funds. In the situation 
where the industrial concentration ratio is high enough, but small municipalities are mostly rural ones and do 
not promise high returns on investment, redistribution of public fund becomes more important. Thus, given 
the degree of fiscal decentralization within a region, the degree of budget revenue inequality is higher, the 
higher is the industrial concentration within a region.  
Implicitly the result reveals the possible political preferences of the regional government towards the 
municipalities. The empirical results support the hypothesis that central government follows egalitarian 
motives trying to provide poor municipalities with the minimum budget instead of redistributing funds in 
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order to support important regional enterprises. That is, coefficient θ in the social welfare function is not 
negligible. Decentralization gives fewer opportunities to the regional government to redistribute taxes and 
transfers and leads to the increasing inequality. Moreover, the result shows that the negative effect resulting 
from the limited ability to redistribute funds outweighs the positive effect, which could possibly be the 
consequence of the more efficient use of public funds by the lower level governments. The model shows that 
imperfect capital mobility can account for the lower increase in the efficiency of the use of public funds by 
lower-level governments as a result of the increased degree of fiscal decentralization.  
Unfortunately, we have only 96-97 years banking lending data to enterprises. Thus, we do not 
possess the sufficient amount of observations for the estimation of the fixed effects regression equation. 
Unexpectedly, the correlation is significant and positive. One possible explanation to the fact is that bank 
credits are given out to large enterprises, which have sufficient influence in the region. This means that the 
presence of the powerful business elite might control banking lending and thus, our measure of the credit 
market imperfections is not really a proxy for the ability of poorer enterprises get financing.    
 
Hypothesis 2: The increase in the level of within-region fiscal decentralization increases welfare 
inequality among municipalities. 
Since budget revenue inequality does not necessarily imply the welfare inequality and, in particular, 
inequality in the living conditions of the population, we also tried to estimate the effects of the increase in the 
degree of fiscal decentralization on the welfare inequality among municipalities. Unfortunately, it is very 
difficult to estimate the “welfare” of municipality. We, however, tried to address the data available. One 
possibility was to construct a composite index based on the level of the public goods provision of the 
population (we have the data on the amount and repairing of hospitals, schools, kilometres of roads with hard 
topper capita, number of telephone lines per capita e.t.c in the municipalities). We, however, decided that 
budget revenue of municipality reflects also the availability of financing for the public goods provision by 
the municipal authorities. Thus, in order to estimate inequality in the living conditions of population in 
different municipalities, we constructed Gini index based on the per capita average wage in municipality. We 
then estimated the same regression equations as in hypothesis 1, except for the dependent variable is now the 
regional Gini index based on the per capita average wage. The results of the estimation are presented in the 
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table. The table shows that we did not find any significant dependence between the degree of fiscal 
decentralization in the region and the degree of per capita average wage inequality. One possible explanation 
to this is that official data on the wages of the population can poorly reflect the real income of the population 
and thus, the differences in the living conditions.   
       
Hypothesis 3: Greater Inequality within region leads to the lower growth rates in poorer municipalities 
(with low budget revenue per capita). Thus, fiscal decentralization could even lead to the decrease in the 
growth rates in the poor regions. 
 
We did not find any support to the fact that inequality among municipalities influences the growth 
rates of the whole region. The results of the regressions are presented in table 8. Besides the inequality 
coefficient we include in the regression equation different variables, which should supposedly influence the 
growth rates of the region as a whole. We include the wealth of the region (total per capita budgetary 
revenue), lagged value of investment into the fixed capital as the share of regional output, the share of the 
extracting industry output in the whole regional output and the degree of industrial concentration within a 
region. All of the inequality variables are insignificant in explaining the regional growth, while the lagged 
value of investment into the fixed capital as the share of regional output, the share of the extracting industry 
output in the whole regional output are both significant and have negative effect. The possible reason for 
inequality variables having no influence on the regional growth is that the effect of the more wealthy 
municipalities could possibly be very strong and even lead to the higher growth rates of the whole region.  
The aim of the research is not only to answer the question whether fiscal decentralization forces the 
gap between pooreer and more wealthy municipalities to increase, which is not excluding the possibility of 
both types of municipalities growing substantially fast. This situation, by itself, could adversely affect the 
growth of the whole region under the condition, that private funds are immobile. The question we are trying 
also to address here is whether it is possible that fiscal decentralization not only influences the gap between 
the two types of municipalities, but also negatively affects the growth rates of poor municipalities. Trying to 
demonstrate a robust relationship between inequality and growth rates we estimate a fixed effects model 
estimating several equations including into the RHS of the regression different inequality measures.  
 36 
 
The results of the panel regressions are presented in the table 9. Both regressions include the full set of year 
dummies, which are necessary to account for since the growth rates in 1997 and 1998 differ even in their 
signs because of the dramatic recession after the 1998 August crisis. Moreover, as we already mentioned 
when specifying the form of the regression equation, year dummies help to control for systematic increases 
or decreases in the municipalities’ budget revenues in particular year induced by an increase or decrease in 
the shared revenues or abolition of taxes simultaneously in all municipalities. This can also happen if the 
federal law mandates public expenditures form the federal and regional to the local level and also transfers 
some revenue sources to meet the new mandated expenditures. We restrict our sample to the subsample of 
municipalities, which was constructed in the following way. We eliminated from the sample of 
municipalities the highest decile (municipalities with the highest per capita total budgetary revenues). The 
regression equation was estimated only for the subsample of these municipalities.   
 Empirical analysis shows that high budget revenue inequality within a region indeed harmful for the 
growth of poorer municipalities. Table 9 indicates the negative coefficients before all the inequality proxies 
except for the own revenue inequality, the effect of which seems to be insignificant for the determining of 
the municipal growth rates. However, this could be also the consequence of the fact that the expenditure and 
decentralization measures are not perfect and could reflect not only the possibility of lower-level 
governments to take their own decisions independently, but also simply the transfer of mandatory spending 
to the local level. In this case, we should believe more to the own revenues decentralization measure. Thus, it 
is still possible, that fiscal decentralization giving real autonomy to the local governments could still induce 
no negative effect on the growth rates of the poor municipalities, while still leading to the growing budget 
revenue inequality within the region. 
 We also include control variables in the regression equation. Empirical analysis shows that higher 
per capita total revenue of municipality leads to the higher growth rates of the municipality. And also, 
municipalities with higher share of extracting industries in their total industrial output demonstrate higher 
growth rates. 
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12. Conclusion 
What could be inferred from the empirical analysis? At first, we can infer that the first two scenarios 
are those more likely to realise as a result of the increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization. That is, 
increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization could result in the two possible outcomes: 
1) Inequality increases as a result of the lack of beneficial opportunities, which could arise in the 
course of redistribution of public funds to the municipalities with potentially higher growth rates. In this case 
redistribution could lead to a greater increase in poor municipalities (with low initial capital conditions but 
sufficient marginal productivity of public funds) wealth as compared to the decrease in the total wealth of 
wealthy municipalities. This exactly means that redistribution could reduce the gap among the wealth of 
municipalities with different capital endowments. The possible scenario could realise if the majority of 
enterprises in the poor municipalities are in the depressed state, but public capital productive investment 
could significantly raise marginal productivity of capital.  
2) If we suggest that the whole region includes both municipalities with high level of production and 
rural rayons with only a small number of enterprises, then the regional administration will naturally 
redistribute public funds from wealthy municipalities to the poorer ones to provide them with the subsistence 
level of public spending. In this case increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization will lead to less 
subsidising of poor municipalities from the regional budget and result in sharp increase in the degree of 
inequality among municipalities.  
3) Empirical analysis do not support our hypothesis concerning the scenario with redistribution 
going in the reverse direction, that is, scenario when public funds move in such a way so that to support 
production of wealthy municipalities. This means that either the sample of regions available do not include 
the regions following this pattern or the result implicitly determine the political preferences of the central 
government, that is, the central government follows egalitarian motives trying to provide poor municipalities 
with the minimum budget instead of redistributing funds in order to support important regional enterprises. 
In this case, allowing the municipalities to manage their tax revenues would not increase the effectiveness of 
their use to a sufficient extent so that to outweigh the losses from interruption in regional financing.   
The empirical analysis shows that the negative effect resulting from the limited ability to redistribute 
funds outweighs the positive effect, which could possibly be the consequence of the more efficient use of 
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public funds by the lower level governments. Although the model shows that imperfect capital mobility can 
account for the lower increase in the efficiency of the use of public funds by lower-level governments as a 
result of the increased degree of fiscal decentralization, we did not find any empirical support to this since 
we did not have sufficient amount of data at the disposal.  
4) We also did not find any support to the fact that budget revenue inequality among municipalities 
could lead to the lower rates of growth in the whole region, which means that the influence of the more 
wealthy municipalities is dominating. However, restricting our subsample on the municipalities excluding 
more wealthy ones we obtain that inequality is indeed retarding the growth rates of budgetary revenues in the 
poorer units.   
 Decentralization well ahead of the pace of restructuring and without well-functioning capital and 
stock markets indeed lead to the even poorer performance of poor municipalities, which tells upon the whole 
region negatively. The trade-off between better efficiency in the use of public funds from the one hand and 
low starting capital conditions, immature capital markets (difficult access to capital markets) and restricted 
mobility of public funds from the other hand decided in favour of the negative effect induced by the absence 
of possibility to borrow and low initial capital of poor municipalities obliging regional administration to 
subsidise them. Thus, the conclusion is that the gap between the poorest and wealthiest municipalities in 
Russian regions increases with the increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization.  
Industry concentration ratio matters while determining the dependence between the level of 
decentralization and degree of municipal inequality. The higher the industry concentration ratio is in the 
region, the greater is the degree of inequality given the same degree of fiscal decentralization.     
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13.  Appendix 1. 
Construction of own and shared revenues 
 1) Own revenues (revenues that are not subject to sharing with the regional government) were constructed as the sum 
of local tax revenues, other taxes (not subject to sharing with regional government) and non-tax municipal income 
             Own revenues = local tax revenue + other taxes (not subject to sharing) + non-tax revenues 
    - Local tax revenues consist of 
• housing & utilities tax  
• advertisement tax 
• holiday resort tax 
• car resale tax 
• fines and taxes for tax offences 
• earmarked duties 
• other tax revenues 
• sales tax (since 1998) 
    - Other taxes (not subject to sharing): license for retail trade in alcohol, individual property tax, land tax (agricultural 
and non-agricultural) 
    - Non-tax revenues consist of 
• revenue from public property ownership and uses 
• proceeds from sales of state property 
• sales of land and intangible assets 
• administrative payments 
• fines and sanctions 
• other non-tax duties 
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Appendix 2. Revenue structure of Podporozhskiy rayon of Leningradskaya oblast’ (1996) 
№ 
п/п 
Revenues % 
1 Income taxes 30,9 
2 Payroll fund 2,6 
3 Taxes on goods and services 10,1 
4 Property taxes 3,2 
5 Levies on users of mineral resources 7,4 
6 Other taxes and duties 10,5 
7 Income from public property and/or other operations 0,6 
8 Revenues from sale of state/municipal property 0,2 
9 Other non-tax revenues 0,5 
 Total revenues 
 
66,0 
 Equalization fund (Fond Viravnivaniya) 12,0 
 Subvention from regional budget 22,0 
 Total revenues 
 
100,0 
 
Expenditure structure of Podporozhskiy rayon of Leningradskaya oblast’ (1996) 
№ 
п/п 
Expenditures % 
1 Public administration and local self-governance 2,9 
2 Law, order, national security  
3 Industry, energy construction 0,1 
4 Agriculture and fishing 2,3 
5 Transport, roads, telecommunication 3,4 
6 Housing and utilities 42,0 
7 Social expenditures 47,7 
8 Other expenditures 1,6 
9 Total expenditures 
 
100,0 
 Budget deficit – 11,4% from the total revenues  
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Appendix 3 
F.O.C.:   
 
 
For the interior solution for the general form production function we get: 
Substituting optimal values of gi* and Si* in the utility functions of municipalities we obtain that the central 
government choses values of Gi and Si* so that to maximize: 
 
The utility function of the central government is linear in Gi + SiG and whether central government decides to 
allocate productive and unproductive subsidies depends on the relative values of the coefficients  
a1(1-θ) and a2(1+θ), with the funds more likely to be transferred to pooper municipality, the more central 
government cares about inequality, that is, the higher is coefficient θ. 
For the Cobb-Duglas production function we get system (1) 
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Appendix 4.  
 
Solving system (1) with 011 =+GS
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Table 1.  Correlations b/w decentralization measures 
 
. pwcorr decexp revdec owndec rtrexp frag if n==1 & id!=3, sig o
| decexp revdec owndec rtrexp frag
-------------+---------------------------------------------
decexp | 1.0000
|
| 176
|
revdec | 0.6839 1.0000
| 0.0000
| 172 290
|
owndec | 0.3103 0.5233 1.0000
| 0.0003 0.0000
| 134 141 144
|
rtrexp | 0.1668 -0.3593 -0.0942 1.0000
| 0.0328 0.0000 0.2829
| 164 166 132 171
|
frag | 0.1892 0.2431 0.2986 -0.1527 1.0000
| 0.0119 0.0000 0.0003 0.0462
| 176 290 144 171 471
Table 3: Mean per capita income of 20% municipalities with lowest and highest incomes per capita 
(average by regions) 
 1996 1997 1998 
Mean per capita income of 20% municipalities with lowest incomes per capita 
(average by regions) 
489 740 643 
Standard deviation of per capita income of 20% municipalities with lowest incomes 
per capita (average by regions) 
372 1152 872 
Minimum value of per capita income of 20% municipalities with lowest incomes per 
capita (average by regions) 
173 234 39 
Maximum value of per capita income of 20% municipalities with lowest incomes per 
capita (average by regions) 
2805 7750 6160 
    
Mean per capita income of 20% municipalities with highest incomes per capita 
(average by regions) 
1375 2137 1967 
Standard deviation of per capita income of 20% municipalities with highest incomes 
per capita (average by regions) 
838 2836 2470 
Minimum value of per capita income of 20% municipalities with highest incomes per 
capita (average by regions) 
414 514 85 
Maximum value of per capita income of 20% municipalities with highest incomes per 
capita (average by regions) 
5605 17058 15944 
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Table 3:   Inequality trends 
 
Inequality measures 
 
Inequality measure / Year 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal revenues (without 
transfers) 
0.3000 0.3288 0.3453 0.3535 
Index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal revenue 
 
0.1606 0.1462 0.1617 0.1633 
Index Gini constructed by per capita total municipal expenditures 
(without transfers) 
0.1863 0.1719 0.1987 0.1934 
Index Gini constructed by "own source" revenue provision of 
municipalities (percent of own revenues in the total amount of 
municipal revenues) 
  
0.3218 0.350 0.353 0.348 
Share of average per capita total revenues of the top richest 20% 
municipalities to the average per capita total revenues of the 20% 
poorest municipalities 
3.97 4.50 4.75 2.90 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Average total regional revenues per capita by the type of municipality * 
 
 1996 1997 1998 
 Per capita total revenue 
 before 
transfers 
after transfers before 
transfers 
after transfers before 
transfers 
after transfers 
Rayons 687 
[897] 
1733 
[1588] 
944 
[946] 
2441 
[2938] 
847 
[842] 
2141 
[3068] 
Cities 1457 
[971] 
2120 
[1240] 
2504 
[3505] 
3577 
[3578] 
2262 
[2939] 
3040 
[3040] 
Cities (not 
main) 
1483 
[1008] 
2170 
[1253] 
2548 
[3611] 
3682 
[4174] 
2321 
[3069] 
3153 
[3778] 
 
* - standard deviations are in parentheses, trinpc – total municipal income per capita, tincpc – total municipal 
income per capita (including transfers) 
 
 
Table 5: Comparing inequality among cities and among rayons. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Among rayons 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.27 
Among cities 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.19 
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Table 6: Measures for fiscal decentralization  
 
Year Number of 
obs 
Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 
 
 
Share of total local expenditures in the consolidated regional expenditures 
 
94 83 0.635 0.63 0.1 0.27 0.84 
95 87 0.651 0.65 0.11 0.17 0.84 
96 12 0.685 0.68 0.11 0.46 0.86 
97 86 0.653 0.65 0.12 0.29 0.84 
98 86 0.646 0.64 0.12 0.20 0.87 
99 74 0.643 0.66 0.115 0.39 0.83 
 
Share of total local revenues in the consolidated regional revenues 
 
93 84 0.403 0.40 0.141 0.05 0.70 
94 83 0.410 0.41 0.128 0.09 0.74 
95 85 0.450 0.45 0.126 0.15 0.71 
96 12      
97 86 0.456 0.46 0.127 0.11 0.73 
98 85 0.450 0.45 0.123 0.12 0.64 
99 73 0.454 0.48 0.120 0.11 0.66 
 
 
Share of total local revenues in the consolidated regional revenues ( without federal transfers ) 
 
96 19 0.518 0.518 0.145 0.176 0.76 
97 32 0.629 0.621 0.135 0.421 0.83 
98 45 0.603 0.595 0.124 0.124 0.94 
 
 
Subnational "own source" Revenues as a Share of Total Revenues 
 
96 14 0.097 0.082 0.078 0.02 0.34 
97 36 0.098 0.091 0.044 0.03 0.24 
98 45 0.109 0.111 0.050 0.02 0.23 
99 59 0.07 0.071 0.03 0.01 0.19 
 
 
Ratio of regional transfers in the total amount of consolidated local revenues 
 
96 15 0.375 0.374 0.131 0.129 0.673 
97 36 0.307 0.287 0.113 0.092 0.573 
98 46 0.269 0.245 0.126 0.0002 0.554 
 
 
Ratio of regional transfers in the total amount of consolidated local expenditures 
 
96 15 0.362 0.376 0.116 0.122 0.560 
97 36 0.293 0.281 0.112 0.090 0.554 
98 46 0.272 0.253 0.126 0.0002 0.569 
99 78 0.19 0.165 0.104 0.001 0.53 
 
Fragmentation ratio 
 
 80 34,6 28,5 20,8 3 89 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 
Table 7. Regional industry concentration ratios  
Year Number of 
obs 
Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
 
Enterprise Herfindal index 
 
96 47 0.089 0.06 0.013 0.346 
97 47 0.097 0.072 0.013 0.352 
98 47 0.123 0.08 0.015 0.418 
 
Share of 1% of the most productive enterprises in the total regional output 
 
96 48 0.425 0.15 0.124 0.782 
97 48 0.40 0.16 0.121 0.773 
98 48 0.41 0.155 0.155 0.704 
 
Municipal Herfindahl index 
 
96 71 0.354 0.16 0.03 0.88 
97 71 0.364 0.167 0.034 0.91 
98 71 0.386 0.177 0.034 0.89 
99 71 0.376 0.167 0.036 0.89 
 
Table 8.  The effect of budget revenue inequality on the growth rates of the whole region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 sincgr sincgr sincgr sincgr 
dsinc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.03) (0.88) (1.04) (1.05) 
mHerfi 0.646 0.548 0.498 0.448 
 (1.50) (1.30) (1.21) (1.06) 
inv_pr -820.581 -850.046 -880.532 -945.491 
 (3.43)*** (3.59)*** (3.82)*** (3.92)*** 
dob -1.150 -1.311 -1.109 -1.183 
 (2.12)** (2.32)** (2.04)** (2.15)** 
pctrgi -0.585    
 (1.27)    
tinin  -0.575   
  (1.17)   
ineq   0.007  
   (1.28)  
ownin    0.185 
    (0.55) 
Constant 0.062 0.031 -0.082 -0.071 
 (0.37) (0.19) (0.54) (0.44) 
Observatio
ns 
117 116 117 117 
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Table 9. Influence of budget revenue Inequality on the growth rates of poorer municipalities (with low 
budget revenue per capita). 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 budrgr1 budrgr1 budrgr1 budrgr1 
Trevpc 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (23.62)*** (23.01)*** (24.29)*** (24.40)*** 
P 0.125 0.091 0.135 0.130 
 (2.83)*** (2.11)** (3.07)*** (2.95)*** 
inv_pr 31.132 149.982 0.027 3.922 
 (0.28) (1.37) (0.00) (0.04) 
Dob 0.653 0.606 0.669 0.619 
 (4.39)*** (4.25)*** (4.46)*** (4.09)*** 
year97 0.395 0.000 0.422 0.402 
 (6.44)*** (.) (6.77)*** (6.54)*** 
year98 0.209 -0.178 0.237 0.214 
 (4.49)*** (10.07)*** (4.91)*** (4.59)*** 
year99 0.000 -0.359 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (6.00)*** (.) (.) 
Pctrgi -0.209    
 (1.88)*    
Tinin  -0.878   
  (6.76)***   
Ineq   -0.012  
   (1.82)*  
Ownin    0.016 
    (0.17) 
Constant -1.201 -0.709 -1.251 -1.279 
 (10.69)*** (12.57)*** (11.76)*** (11.53)*** 
Observations 2271 2252 2271 2271 
Number of munic 1074 1074 1074 1074 
R-squared 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 
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Table 12. Correlation of budget revenue inequality among municipalities and share of credits 
given out by banks to municipal enterprises in the total regional output 
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